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FOREWORD
STASIS AND CHANGE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE FORDHAM
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Gerald S. Dickinson* and Sheila R. Foster**
INTRODUCTION
The Fordham Environmental Law Review was officially
recognized as a law journal in 1993, although it debuted in 1989 as
the Fordhan Environmental Law Report.' Professor Joseph Sweeney
2authored the Foreword to the new law review, remarking that
Editor-in-Chief, Fordham Environmental Law Review, Volume XXIV. I would
like to thank the Review Editorial Board and staff for their hard work and
dedication to the 20th Anniversary issue. Special thanks to Talia Metson,
Managing Editor., Andreas Koudellou, Senior Notes & Articles Editor and the
seven Notes & Articles Editors - Inessa Abayev, Kyu Hee Chu, Kari Kepple, Sara
Kirby., Nicole Lodge, Jigar Patel and Steven Wrabel- for their research and editing
assistance on the Foreword.
* Albert A. Walsh Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Fordhani University School of
Law.
1. The Report was renamed the Fordham Environmental Law Journal in 1993.
In 2000, the students decided to rename the Journal as the Fordhan Environmental
Law Review. But the process of going from the Report, to the Journal to the Review
started in 1987 with a group of student advocates who ardently fought for an
environminental law publication at Fordham. See Joseph C. Sweeney, Remarks on
the Founding of the Environmental Law Journal, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1
(1993). In 1987, John Tsavaris, Derek Adler, Michael Guzzo, Julie Moran and Phil
Hirschorn, advocated for a journal, however, the Fordham faculty was opposed at
the time. However, in February 1989, the Report started publishing environmental
material under Editor-in-Chief Bruce Aber. Three students - Brita Forsberg (1990),
Cynthia Carney Johnson (1991), and Andrew Neuman (1992) - would serve as
Editors-in-Chief over the next three years before the Report was granted Journal
status.
2. Id. See also Joseph C. Sweeney, Protection of the Environment in the
U nited States, I FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 1 (1989). In order to jump-start the
1
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"because the field of Environmental Law is still in its initial stages,
your [students'] work is perfonned in the dawn of this intellectual
discipline."3 In many ways. Professor Sweeney was right. The
Review came of age as the field of environmental law, and the
scholarship shaping that field, was developing and extending in new
directions.
As the articles and essays in this special anniversary issue of the
Review, reflect, the past twenty years of enviromnental law are
marked as much by legislative stasis as by profound change in the
way that lawyers, policyrmakers, and scholars interact with the field.
Although no new federal legislation was passed over the past two
decades, much has changed about the field of environmental law.
This change is the result of a set of conceptual and legal challenges to
the field posed by intellectual and policy movements that took root
around the time that the Review came into being. The intellectual and
policy movements that have most profoundly shaped the field of
enviromnuental law in the past 20 years are: the property rights
movement, the environmental justice movement, and cost-benefit
analysis. These movements and policy tools arose, in large part, as a
response to the major legislative and policy successes of the 1960s
and 1970s.
The Review, has been an important forum for the development of
each of these movements. This Foreword looks back at some of the
key symposia and articles published during the last twenty years to
illustrate the influence of the Review in the development of each of
these areas. This influence stretches from the judiciary, where some
of the articles have significantly shaped important parts of the
doctrinal landscape, to some of the ongoing intellectual and policy
debates among environmental scholars.
The essays and articles that follow the Foreword bring us from the
Rev iew 's past into its present, and towards its future. Entitled The
Current State of Environmental Law, Volume 24 contains the
intellectual musings of some of the most-distinguished scholars in the
process Professor Sweeney, the advisor at the time, turned a talk he had given on
environmental protection into the Report's first publication. The Report., however,
did not have official journal status and the students had a difficult time convincing
some skeptical Faculty members otherwise. Alas, in December 1993, after several
false starts, the faculty voted and granted journal status, which included academic
credits and financial stipends. Sweeney, supra note 1. at 1.
3. See Sweeney, supra note 1. at 2.
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environmental law discipline - both rising and established academic
giants - as they reflect on the current state of the field, as well as the
issues that confront its future.
I. STASIS AND DEVELOPMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The legislative and regulatory victories of the 1960s and 1970s
created a federal framework that has proven remarkably effective in
addressing what were, at the time, our most pressing enviromnental
challenges. However, even with an abundance of laws, administrative
regulations, and developed doctrine interpreting and applying those
laws and regulations, there are new challenges yet to be fully
confronted. The field of environmental law remains exciting because
its boundaries have yet to be fully expanded to meet these challenges.
Even as Congress has been relatively dormant over the years, courts
and scholars have stepped into the void to craft solutions with the
tools that Congress has already given us.
A. Legislative Stasis
The basic structure of federal environmental law has remained in
place over the last two decades. As Victor Flatt explains in his
contribution to this issue, the "watershed" legislation passed by
Congress in the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),
the 1970 Clean Air Act ("CAA"), and the 1972 Clean Water Act
("CWA") was comprehensive in scope and especially effective at
tackling our most pressing environmental problems. These Acts and
the regulatory apparatus that accompany them have been remarkably
4. The Editorial Board of the Review was honored to have received an
overwhelmingly positive response from so many scholars who wanted to join the
book to reflect on the past twenty years of environmental law. Because of that
response., the 20th Anniversary issue is spread across three editions - Part I & Part
I in this book and Part III to appear at the end of 2013 in a second book. The
distinguished list of scholars in this groundbreaking book include Professor Hope
Babcock, Professor Ann Carlson, Professor Robin Kundis Craig, Professor David
Dana, Professor Victor Flatt, Professor Alice Kaswan, Professor Alexandra Klass,
Professor Thomas McGarity and Professor John Nolon. The book also includes a
student Note by Inessa Abavev, Fordham Law School '13.
5. Victor B. Flatt, Frozen in Time: The Ossification of Environmental
Statutory Change and the Theatre of the (Administrative) Absurd, 24 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 125, 128 (2013).
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successful in reducing major air pollution, improving water quality,
stemming the loss of wetlands, and ensuring a close review of major
development projects which threaten the environment.6 Yet, major
environmental challenges remain, including non-point source
pollution and climate change. Despite these contemporary
environmental challenges, no significant changes have been made to
these iconic statutes since Congress amended the CAA in 1990.7 As
one scholar has recently remarked, "[lt]he period of statutory inaction
(1991-2012) now exceeds the period of statutory growth (1970-
1990)" and no major federal statute appears on the horizon.
What is difficult about many of our most pressing, contemporary
environmental challenges is that the scale and diffuse nature of the
problems make federal legislative action an unsatisfactory and
incomplete response. As David Dana notes in his contribution to this
issue, the "matching principle" in environmental federalism dictates
that the legal response to an environmental problem should be
matched to its physical scale. 9 But, as he argues, we do not live in a
simple world of the Matching Principle. It is difficult to draw hard
6. See e.g. William L. Andreen, Success and Backlash: The Remarkable
(Continuing) Story of the Clean IWater Act, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L.
25, 26 (2013): ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND PoLIcY 117 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing how federal preemption of
state law is used sparingly in environmental law, including in the Clean Air Act);
See Henry A. Waxman, Gregory S. Wetstone and Philip S. Barnett, Cars, Fuels,
and Clean Air: A Review of Title II of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
ENVTL. L. 21 (1991); Bryan Lee, Highlights of the Clean Air Act Amendments off
1990 41 J. AIR & WASTE MAN. Assoc. 1, 16-19 (1991). See Howard R. Marek,
Note, Inaction as Action Under Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 58 TEX. L. REV. 393 (1980). Thomas 0. McGarity, Courts, the
Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues. 55 TEX. L. REV. 801 (1976).
7. The 1990 amendment to the Clean Air Act encouraged the use of market-
based principles and other innovative approaches., like performance-based
standards and emission banking and trading, to achieve pollution reduction goals.
See Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q
(West Supp. 1991)).
8. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (noting that reasonable arguments can be made that
emerging issues such as fracking, environmental estrogens, nanotechnology, non-
point source pollution., and deepwater oil drilling would be better addressed with a
major federal statute).
9. David A. Dana, One Green America: Continuities and Discontinuities in
Environmental Federalism in the United States, 24 FORDHAi ENVTL. L. REV. 103,
105-106 (2013).
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lines between localized and cross-state pollution, and it is not always
possible to separate out federal and state interests regarding most
environmental problems.
Climate change is an excellent example of these blurry lines. It is
an issue of growing international, national and local concern. On an
international level, climate change characterizes the kind of
collective action problem that Garret Hardin wrote about in his
famous and stylized The Tragedy of the Commons fo The lack of
consensus and a political bargain which would bring both the major
developed and developing countries together to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions has stymied efforts to meet binding international
reduction targets for GHGs. On a national level, despite the
development of regional greenhouse gas trading programs,12
Congress has yet to pass comprehensive legislation on climate
change. The EPA, however, has developed traditional emissions
limitations for motor vehicles, and is in the process of developing
regulations for coal-fired power plants.'1 Finally, local governments
must now deal with climate change adaptation as the effects of global
warming are beginning to manifest in more powerful storns capable
of causing tremendous damage to urban infrastructure and residential
communities.
As Alexandra Klass explains in her essay, the EPA's efforts to
combat climate change through rules and regulations governing
14greenhouse gas emissions signals a growing convergence -
prompted by climate change - between energy law and
environmental law, which may lead to greater state initiated
policies.' 5 Although states have some flexibility to take advantage of
10. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC. 1243 (1968).
11. See David G. Victor, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE
EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET (2011).
12. See Conservation Law Foundation, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
available at http://www.clf.org/programs/cases.asp?id=341 [hereinafter CLF,
RGGI]; Conservation Law Foundation, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
Background, http://ww.clf.org/programs/cases/asp.?id=340 (last visited Feb. 26,
2007) [hereinafter CLF, Background]. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) is a multi-state cooperative agreement establishing a cap-and-trade
program that targets C02 emissions.
13. Massachusetts v. E.P.A. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (2007).
14. Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of
Environmental and Energy Law., 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 182 (2013).
15. Id.
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the legislative gap left by federal inaction, few states have stepped
out in front to do so. California is the notable exception to this
statement, leading the legislative push to tackle greenhouse gas
emissions on a state level.' 6 However, as Ann Carlson's contribution
to this issue stresses, even a state like California can only be effective
in taking the legislative leave if it has developed deep regulatory
capacity and expertise to do so.' The particular and unique role that
California has played has not yet been replicated elsewhere and it
remains to be seen whether other states will join California in taking
the lead on some of our most pressing environmental problems.
Nevertheless, state and local governments are likely to be where
the action is, given the federal legislative hiatus. State and local land
use planning will have an increasingly important role to play,
particularly for non-point source pollution and hydrofracking. As
John Nolon's contribution points out, most environmental damage
today is caused by non-point source pollution resulting from land
uses that are the responsibility of municipal govennments." One
important trend among local governments has been the adoption of
laws that protect natural resources and respond to enviromnental
risks that pose a threat of harn local communities. Inessa Abayev's
Note in this issue highlights the fact that the risks of hydrofracking
are fairly localized, around certain regions of the country, and argues
for a federal regulatory approach to fully address the risks of the
wastewater that is a byproduct of that process.19 Given the legislative
stasis, however, the more likely scenario is that the states where
hydrofracking is occurring will take the lead on this issue.
16. Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488 (California Global Warming Solutions
Act of 2006, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38550-38599 (West 2006)).
17. Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership:
California's Climate Policy., 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 64-65 (2013)
(pointing out that California's capacity comes from federal law singling out
California to lead on mobile source emissions, repeated past regulatory success
which has won the confidence of public and elected officials, agency structure and
revenue sources).
18. John R. Nolon, Shifting Paradigms Transform Environmental and Land Use
Law: The Emergence of the Law of Sustainable Development., 24 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 242, 250, 270 (2013).
19. See generally Inessa Abayev, Hydraulic Fracturing Wastewater: Making
the Case for Treating the Environmentally Condemned, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 275 (2013).
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B. Doctrinal Development
Even as Congress was in stasis, federal and state courts have
continued to confront and develop the legislative and regulatory
contours of federal environental statutes. Important questions of
statutory interpretation, the scope of administrative discretion and
legislative delegation have kept federal and state courts very engaged
during this period of legislative stasis. It is here where the Reviewi has
exerted a palpable influence on the developing doctrine of
environental law. A look back at some of the more impactful
articles published in the Review reveals some of the ways in which
these articles shaped the interpretation of important aspects of federal
environmental law. One area of particular doctrinal importance over
the last twenty years was the scope of civil and criminal liability
under CERCLA, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") and other federal environental statutes.
Civil remedies were the primary avenue to protect the public,
largely because environmental activities that affected others, such as
pollution, had yet to engender the moral condemnation associated
with cminal activity. 20 However, civil remedies were increasingly
seen as insufficient to bring about desired progress in achieving more
robust compliance, the result of which was an increase in the use of
21
criminal provisions of federal environmental statutes.21 These
changes were seen as important tools in the arsenal of enforcement
mechanisms.22 Thus, courts were called upon to review the scope of
both civil and, in particular, criminal liability dating back to the
1970s and particularly in the 1990s during the Review 's beginning
stages. 23
20. Robert A. Milne, Iens Rea Requirements of the Federal Environmental
Statutes: Strict Criminal Liability in Substance But -Not Form, 37 BUFF. L. REV.
307, 308 (1989).
21. Id. at 308-09.
22. Robert G. Schwartz, Jr., Comment., Criminalizing Occupational Safety
Violations: The Use of "Knowing Endangerment" Statutes To Punish Employers
W1ho Maintain Toxic Working Conditions, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 488
(1990).
23. F. Henry Habicht, 11, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal
Enforcement: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10478, 10479
(1987).
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1. Developing Civil Liability
In a 1994 article on the CERCLA,24 Eileen Eglin and Stephen
Straus took on the developing area of environental insurance law,
which at the time would have had an impact on the liability coverage
for potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") for costs associated with
the EPA's investigation of contaminated sites.25 The author's main
point was to show that under insurance policies where defense costs
do not serve to impair the coverage limit, the insured will be
incentivized to classify expenses acquired in legal actions as defense
costs instead of indemnification.26 Indeed, the cost-exclusive
insurance policy at issue in the article - comprehensive general
liability ("CGL") - was quite different from other policies that
entailed defense costs that counted towards the stated policy limit.
Thus, any combination of settlements, judgments and defense costs
which equals the stated coverage limit may exhaust such a policy, the
authors argued.27
In regards to its relationship to environmental law, the authors
posited that the role of government-mandated remedial
investigation/feasibility ("RI/FS") studies in a waste facility clean-up
pursuant to CERCLA weigh heavily in favor of classifying related
costs as indemnification rather than defense under a policy of CGL
insurance. This article helped to resolve a case before the New Jersey
Supreme Court, General Acc. Ins. Co. of America v. State, Dept. of
Environmental Protection, in which Judge Daniel J. O'Hern held that
a remand was required so that the lower court could decide how to
fairly allocate costs of the RI/FS between the policy's indemnity and
defense provisions.28 The court did not waste any time in its analysis
of the issue at hand and invoked the Review 's article in only the third
paragraph of the opinion. The court said, "A recent law review article
[the Revieiw] summarizes the issues in this case. We cannot improve
24. Eileen B. Eglin & Stephen D. Straus, Classifying RI/FS Costs U1nder a
Policy of Comprehensive General Liability Insurance: Indemnity or Defense?, 5
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 385 (1994).
25. Id. at 386.
26. Id. at 387.
27. See Eglin and Straus, supra note 24, at 387.
28. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of America v. State, Dep't. of Envtl. Prot,. 143 N.J.
462 (1996).
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upon the presentation." 29 The court cited six full paragraphs from the
article in the opinion, which the court relied on, in part, in coming to
a decision.30 The article was later cited by the United States District
Court of New Jersey in Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co.3
Lemuel M. Srolovic and Pamela R. Esterman's 1998 Reviewi
article 32  helped to influence cost-shifting under CERCLA's
contribution provision. In Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha
Corp., 3the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs in a CERCLA
contribution action were not required to show causation to establish a
defendant's liability.34 The Court reasoned that another lower court's
decision in Massachusetts on the matter of CERCLA was "criticized
by commentators as a deviation from prior CERCLA case law,"
including the article by Esterman and Srolovic.3 Esterman and
Srolovic had argued - and the Court subsequently acknowledged -
that "if followed by other courts, this amorphous threshold burden
would establish a significant impediment to shifting costs under
CERCLA. Such a rule shifts the focus of contribution actions from
determining shared responsibility to conducting cost-benefit analyses
of litigation."36
29. Id. at 464-465. The crucial part of the Review 's article that the court relied
to summarize the main issue in the case was as follows:
There is no secret as to why an insured under a cost-exclusive policy would
argue that RI/FS costs should be classified as part of the insurer's duty to
defend. To the extent [that] expenses associated with performing a waste site
RI/FS can be attributed to the defense component of the policy, there would
be more indemnity coverage potentially available to satisfy the
policyholder's liability for the clean-up. There would also be more indemnity
coverage potentially available to satisfy liability associated with other claims.
Eglin and Straus, supra note 24, at 388.
30. See Gen. Accident Ins. Co. at 464-66
31. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 978 F. Supp. 589
at n. 6 (D.N.J. 1997).
32. Lemuel M. Srolovic & Pamela R. Esterman, Fold or Fight: The Changing
Settlement Calculus in CERCLA Enforcement Actions, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
469 (1998).
33. Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha Corp., 228 F.3d 648, 654 n.4
(6th Cir. 2000).
34. Id. at 656, 660.
35. Id. at 654.
36. See Srolovic & Esterman, supra note 32, at 481.
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On another issue regarding contribution actions under CERCLA,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon a student Note in
the Review examining the defense clause and judicial interpretations
of common law tort defenses under CERCLA." In the case, Town of
Munster Ind. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Inc.. the Court held that
CERCLA did not permit the assertion of equitable defense of laches
to bar recovery in the Town of Munster's claim for contribution.38 In
the Note, a new interpretation was posited that would not "strain the
language of the statute, and resolve[d] the question of whether the
enumerated defenses are exclusive."39 In its analysis of the language
in the defense clause, the Court references the Note saying, "though
we need not (and do not) decide the matter, we doubt seriously that
res judicata, collateral estoppel, accord and satisfaction, and statutes
of limitation are 'defenses' as CERCLA employs that tenn."40
2. Expanding Criminal Liability
The advent of criminal liability under federal statutes in
environmental law originated from what the Supreme Court in
Morissette v. United States noted was the genesis of public welfare
offenses from the Industrial Revolution.41 An increase in regulations
followed from this period which constrained certain activities that
affect public health, safety or welfare.42 Courts have looked to these
public welfare statutes to delineate the scope of criminal liability for
polluters who knowingly violate federal environmental laws. 43
The rise of criminal liability in environmental law forced courts to
review issues concerning corporate officers' intent or knowledge of
statutory violations under the new felony provisions that were part of
37. Town of Munster, In. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Inc.. 27 F.3d 1268. 1272
(1994) (citing Jonathan T. Uejio, Note, Common Law Tort Defenses Under
CERCLA, I FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 81, 84 (1989)).
38. Id. at 1273.
39. See Uejio, supra note 37., at 84.
40. See Town of Munster, supra note 37., at 1272.
41. 342 U.S. 246 at 254 (1952).
42. Id.
43. See e.g. U.S. v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1296 (1993).
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the reauthorizations of some of the environmental statutes in the
1980s and 1990s.44
For example, litigants increasingly pushed, under these laws, to
hold officers liable pursuant to the responsible corporate officer
("RCO") doctrine. The doctrine did not require a responsible
corporate officer to have malicious intent, or any intent at all, which
meant that it was possible for the corporate officer - of say, a
company that engaged in high-pollutant activity - to be held liable
under the RCO even if the officer was unaware of the bad act.45
A 1996 article by Barbara DiTata, influenced the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in U.S. v. Iverson.46 The Court held that,
under the CWA and state and local law, a defendant is a RCO if the
"person has authority to exercise control over the corporation's
activity that is causing discharge. " DiTata's article examined
Section 6928(d) of RCRA, which imposed criminal liability on "Any
person who.. .knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous
waste identified or listed" without a permit or in violation of any
existing RCRA permit condition. 48 DiTata argued, however, that the
vague language in the statute left doubts as to the meaning of
"knowingly" and questioned whether the knowledge requirement is
required for all elements of the crime and whether the knowledge
may be proven by reliance on the RCO doctrine.49 The Court, in its
recitation of the history of doctrine, cited the article to make its point
that a corporate officer may be held criminally liable if- by virtue of
his or her position and authority within the company - the officer had
the power to prevent or correct the conduct which gave rise to the
violation. 0
A 1995 Review article by John Gibson argued that criminal
punishment may be more likely to deter individuals, such as
44. See also Judson W. Starr and Thomas J. Kelly, Jr., Environmental Crimes
and the Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Has Come... and It is Hard Time, 20
EiNVTL. L. REP. 10096, 10097 n.7 (1990).
45. Id.
46. DiTata, Proof of Knowledge U1nder RCRA and Use of the Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine. 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 795 (1996), cited in Iverson
162 F.3d 1015, 1023.
47. Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1025.
48. DiTata, supra note 46, at 795 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)).
49. See DiTata, supra note 46, at 796.
50. See U1nited States v. Dotteriweich, 320 U.S. 277 at 281 (1943). See also
Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1023.
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corporate officers, rather than legal entities such as a corporation.5' In
the article, Gibson explains that the deterrent effect of prosecuting a
manager or lower-level corporate employee of a plant on the
corporation "would be minimal unless a corporate officer or other
senior manager, whose policies or direct orders led to the criminal
environmental conduct, is also held accountable."52
Professor Richard Lazarus notably expressed concerns about the
developing scope of criminal liability in environmental law in his
1996 article on Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law: Reading
Supreme Court Tea Leaves, published as part of the Review's
Symposium that year. 5 In his essay, Professor Lazarus commented
on Babbit v. Swiieet Home Chapter of Communities Jbr a Great
Oregon, noting that the case was undoubtedly the "most significant
recent Supreme Court environmental case."54 The questions posed by
the Supreme Court in oral arguments in S4 eet Home, Professor
Lazarus argued, "reflected considerable concern that, absent a
meaningful mens rea element, a broad construction of the
jurisdictional reach of the Endangered Species Act could criminalize
conduct lacking the normal indicia of culpability necessary for
criminal prosecution."ss
Professor Lazarus then foreshadowed that the Swi eet Home
"colloquy may represent the dawning of a debate likely to occur in
the near future regarding mens rea in environmental crime." 6 Indeed,
his argument was that "the confrontation over mens rea in the
Supreme Court is instead most likely to arise in a felony prosecution
brought pursuant to the Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and
51. See John Gibson, The Crime qf "Knowing Endangerment" Under the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990: Is It More "Bark Than Bite" as a Watchdog to Help
Safeguard a Workplace Free From Life-Threatening Hazardous Air Pollutant
Releases, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 197, 206 (1995).
52. Id
53. Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law: Reading
Supreme Court Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 861 (1996).
54. Id
55. Id at 862. See also Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon 515 U.S. 687 (1995). However, the issue at hand in Sweet Home was
the validity of the Secretary of the Interior's expansive reading of the scope of
Section 9 of the ESA to include significant habitat modification that kills or injures
wildlife by impairing its essential behavioral patterns, "including breeding, feeding,
or sheltering." See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
56. Id. at 878.
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Recovery Act, or perhaps even the Clean Air Act," not the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). He was right.
I. CHANGING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Perhaps what most characterizes the past twenty years of the field
of environmental law are the challenges posed to the field by three
powerful intellectual and policy movements. Each of these
movements was sparked, arguably in part, by the remarkable
legislative and regulatory progress that characterized the twenty year
period from 1970 to 1990. The rise of the property rights movement,
the environmental justice movement and cost-benefit analysis might
be seen as an attempt to reorient environmental law towards a set of
broader concerns. The Review 's contribution to the development and
critiques of these movements is evident in the symposia and articles
that it published by prominent scholars who were staking out new
conceptual terrain designed to challenge existing legislative and
policy frameworks.
A. The Property Rights Mfovement
Although federal environmental regulations are not the only
subject of "regulatory takings," they are the most prominent. Because
laws like the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act, concerning the preservation of wetlands,
impose regulatory constraints on developers, private property
proponents have pushed long and hard against the coercive weight of
land use regulation aimed at achieving enviromnental protection. As
Jonathan Adler, explains, the "[T]he real impetus for the property-
rights movement is outrage at specific cases of govermnent abuse of
landowners., 5  The modern day property rights movement is in
response to these cases, which proponents believe represent an attack
on private property. As Justice Holmes eloquently stated in Mahon,
the "general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."59 The jurisprudence on regulatory takings has proven quite
57. Id. at 879.
58. Jonathan H. Adler, Takings Cause, NAT'L L. REV., Dec. 19, 1994., at 32. 35.
59. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (reasoning that
"when it [regulation] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there
20131] 3
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murky and has not materialized the way proponents such as Richard
Epstein expected, leaving the basic structure of the legislative
landscape intact.
Since lahon, regulatory cases such as Nollan and Dolan, have
turned on different tests, requiring an "essential nexus" 61 and "rough
proportionality" when the state approves a development based on its
dedication for the public purpose (or public use). In those cases, the
landowners were barred from developing the land in the service of a
broader public purpose. Courts, essentially, have remained wedded to
making the regulatory takings determination based on what
proportion of the value of the land has been devalued as a result of
the regulatory taking's challenge. The determination of the extent of
devaluation of the property, not the person, has long been the
standing practice of the Court.
The Review 's 1995 Symposium, entitled Perspectives on
Regulatory Takings. brought together prominent property law
scholars to discuss these challenges. The lead author in that
Symposium issue was Professor Frank Michelman, the
Bacon/Kilkenney Distinguished Visiting Professor at Fordham Law
that year and whose contribution to the Revieiw came in the face of a
burgeoning property rights movement, which attracted criticism by
must be an exercise of eminent domain." Id. The Mahon opinion, however,
explains that a regulation is a taking when it denies the landowner all economically
viable, beneficial, productive, or feasible use of their land. Id. The regulation must
also have significant impact on the landowner's investment-backed expectations
and must substantially advance legitimate state interests. However, scholars have
criticized the decision and questioned whether Adahon should be interpreted as our
modem day precedent for regulatory takings. See William Michael Treanor, Jam
for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO L. J. 813, 861
(1998).
60. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Adahon, 260 U.S. 393; Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1982); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Lingle v.
Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
61. Nollan, 483, U.S. at 837.
62. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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property scholars. 3 Professor Michelman's article convincingly
argued that proposed federal property rights legislation at the time -
H.R. 925 of the 104th Congress, § 2 (the "Private Property Protection
Act of 1995") and the S. 605 of the 104th Congress (the "Omnibus
Property Rights Act of 1995") - was problematic in two ways.64 The
former law, passed by the House of Representatives, would have
compensated property owners if a specific government activity
devalued the property by 20%.65 The latter legislation, which awaited
vote at the Senate, would have compensated property owners if the
state action devalued the property by 33% or more. 66
On one hand, Professor Michelman argued, the legislation was
narrow in that it provided compensation - or in other words,
protections - for specific property, such as owners of land, but not
personal property, which failed to affect the "deserving constituency"
and instead benefited a small segment of the population.6 Second,
the legislation violated the "constitutional culture" which embraces
an ancient law of property tradition that is "functionally oriented to
contemporary community goals, as well as to protection of private
advantage, and that relies on the police powers of legislatures,
alongside common law adjudication by courts, to negotiate and
mediate between the two." 68 Indeed, the legislative protections were
not extended to all property as affected by all regulation.69 The
taxpayers' money, Professor Michelman argued, was to be used for a
select few private property owners as forms of compensation.70
Congress, therefore, chose the property rights of a select few owners
over the public interest obligations of government .
Professor Michelman's presentation at Fordham Law became the
central focus of his testimonial appearance in front of the very
Congress he was castigating in his article, and later erupted into an
63. William M. Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings,
and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1997).
64. Frank 1. Michelman, A Skeptical View of "Property Rights" Legislation,
6 FORDHAM EiNVTL. L.J. 409 (1995).
65. Id at 410.
66. Id at 417. n. 36.
67. Id. at 410. n. 9.
68. Id. at 416.
69. Id. at 417.
70. Id. at 413.
71. Id. at 411-413.
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intellectual jostle with Epstein.72 Professor Michelman, only four
months after presenting his article at the Review 's Symposium on
February 27th, 1995,7 was in Washington D.C. on June 27th giving
his testimony before the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works criticizing the legislatures proposed property rights
legislation. 74 He was, to be mild, onto something groundbreaking and
its origins can be traced back to the Review.
Thanks to Professor Michelman, the Review was cited in another
court opinion in the case, In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes
Associates, at the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 2003. The
opinion, by former Justice William Lamb, held that agricultural
zoning, designed to prevent the development of property and to
"freeze" its substantially undeveloped state to serve the public
interest constituted unlawful reverse spot zoning, 76 which was
beyond the municipality's proper powers.7
While engaging in a discussion of balancing public and private
property interests, Judge Lamb cited language from Professor
Michelman's article that said, "The American way, as the Court
describes it, is to treat the bulk of events as belonging to the normal
give-and-take of a progressive and democratic society: it is to treat
regulation as an ordinary part of background risk and opportunity,
against which we all take our chances in our roles as investors in
72. See generally Richard A. Epstein, W1hose Democratic Vision of the Takings
Clause? A Comment on Frank Michelman's Testimony on Senate Bill 605. 49
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 17 (1996) (criticizing Michelman's
condemnation of the property rights movement and legislation). See also Frank 1.
Michelman, A Brief Response to Richard Epstein, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 25 (1996).
73. See John D. Feerick, Welcoming Remarks at the Fordham University
Environmental Law Review Symposium: Perspectives on Regulatory Takings
(February 27, 1995) in 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 407 (1995).
74. Frank 1. Michelman, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public W1orks, June 2, 1995, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 1 (1996) (discussing the "property rights" legislation as "rest[ing] on a
mistakenly oversimplified, a mistakenly purist, view of the place of private
property rights, basic and important as those certainly are, in our full constitutional
scheme.").
75. In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 576 Pa. 115, 838 A.2d 718
(2003).
76. See id, at 721.
77. See id, at 120.
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property."78 The court - in reference to Professor Michelman and
other scholars - said "it is important to maintain the perspective that
land use regulation is a traditional, legislative tool implemented in
furtherance of broader public concerns - compliance with non-
arbitrary regulation is generally an accepted incident to land
ownership and investment." 79 The court presumably was aware that
Professor Michelman's concerns for property rights had already been
tried and tested in front of Congress eight years prior.
Professor William Fischel's essay for the Review's 1995
Symposium was a short preview of two major themes - fairness and
the capacity for judicial review - in his book, Regulatory Takings.
Law, Economics and Politics."0 Fischel eloquently explained that
takings are not about economic efficiency, but fairness.81 In
particular, he used the dual issue of rent control and historic
preservation to make his point that exit - the ability to withhold
resources or to remove them from the threat of regulation - cannot
work "where the asset being regulated is immovable or otherwise
inelastic in supply... [t]he paradigm of that, of course, is land."82
Voice - the general ability to participate in and influence political
processes - is another protection from excessive regulation. 83 Hence,
he argued that where historical preservation regulations impose land
use restrictions similar to rent control, courts may deject voluntary
preservation. Rent control, he argued, diminishes the value of
apartment buildings and "landlords will begin hiring mediocre
architects or asking good architects to design mediocre buildings that
will not be landmarked." 84
The issue of regulatory takings is ongoing in environmental law,
even as recent as this term in the U.S. Supreme Court. 8 In Koontz v.
78. See Michelian, supra note 64, at 415.
79. See In re Realen Valley Forge, supra note 75.
80. See Villiam A. Fischel, Lead U1is Not into Penn Station: Takings, Historic
Preservation, and Rent Control, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 749 (1995).
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 751.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 754.
85. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 133 S.Ct. 420 (No. 11-
1447) (2013) (determining whether an agency can be held liable for a taking when
it refuses to issue a land-use permit on the sole basis that the landowner did not
give consent to a specific permit condition, such as off-site mitigation, and
whether, if applied, the denial of the permit violates the essential nexus and rough
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St. Johns River Water Mlfanagenent Dist., the Court, at oral
arguments, was faced with the question of whether a land use agency
can deny a landowner a land use permit to develop wetlands if the
landowner did not give consent to a specific condition in the permit,
including the performance of off-site mitigation. Indeed, the
Nollan/Dolan tests hang in the balance. As the doctrine and theory
continue to develop, the Review will continue to invite scholarship
that explores and analyzes both the usefulness and limitations of
regulatory takings analysis on environmental regulation.
B. The Environmental Justice Movement
The Review was also at the forefront of the emerging
environmental justice movement that was in a formative stage in
legal scholarship. As Professor Alice Kaswan's essay for the 20th
Anniversary issue indicates, environmental justice scholars
emphasized the role of "place" - the places where the environental
impacts occur - as an organizing principle for getting regulators and
policymakers to attend to the unequal distribution of pollution. 86 As
Kaswan argues, the effort to address race and class disparities in
pollution distribution are made quite difficult by the relative
powerlessness of impacted groups, as opposed to energy companies
and the agricultural lobby. Kaswan's piece in this issue illustrates
both the tensions created by the rise of the environmental justice
movement and the opportunities that it created to shape
environental policy in new directions, as well as to broaden the
movement to those not historically aligned with the mainstream
environmental movement
Although the environmental justice movement has its roots in
grassroots organizing, the legal field of environmental justice
developed by deploying Civil Rights law and doctrine to challenge
the lack of attention to racial disparities in pollution exposure. The
Review 's 1999 Symposium on environmental justice explored the
efficacy of these strategies. As Melva J. Hayden posed the question,
proportionality tests set out in Nollan and Dolan. The court also entertained the
question of whether the nexus and proportionality tests apply to a land-use exaction
that is substantially the same as a government demanding that a permit applicant
dedicate personal property to a public use).
86. See generally Alice Kaswan., Environmental Justice and Environmental
Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 149 (2013).
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the issue that scholars were compelled to address was whether the
EPA has done enough to protect racial minorities from environmental
hazards and whether Title VI is a useful legal tool to be used instead
of, or alongside, existing environmental statutory provisions. 7 But,
as Fordham Professor Nicholas Johnson argued, there are hard
questions underlying the environmental justice challenge to the field.
These include: "what is the base line against which we measure
disparate impact," "what we mean by environmental justice," and
"is...distributional justice environmentally sound[?]" 88
Professor Sheila Foster,89 then an Associate Professor at Rutgers,
offered her assessment of why civil rights strategies were so essential
to the nascent environmental justice movement. In an essay on the
use of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1963 in the environmental
context, Foster argued that "[e]nvironmental permitting processes too
often favor the interests of the facility developer." 90 The claims
against federal rules designed to protect low-income minority
communities have been viewed as paternalistic. However, as Foster
explains, this assumes a level of "community self-determination that
simply does not exist in low-income minority communities,
particularly in the decision-making process to site hazardous
facilities." 91 This was due to communities being historically left out
of the decision making process. 92
Foster's essay was cited in a United States District Court of New
Jersey case, South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dept. of
Environmental Protection, involving a cormnunity organization's
Title VI action against a state environmental protection agency for its
pattern of permitting air pollution permits disproportionally in
communities of color.>3 In using Title VI to vacate the air permit in
87. See generally Melva J. Hayden, A Perspective on the Environmental
Protection Agency's Title VI and Environmental Justice Programs, 10 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 359 (1999).
88. Nicholas Johnson, Panel Discussion., The Past, Present and Future qf Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act as a Tool of Environmental Justice, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 393, 394-95 (1999).
89. Sheila Foster, Piercing the Veil of Economic Arguments Against Title VI
Enforcement. 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 331 (1999).
90. See id at 343.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dept. of Environental
Protection 145 F.Supp.2d 446., 484. (D. N.J. 2001).
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that case, the court highlighted "that the application of a Title VI
analysis to enviromnental permitting decisions has been the subject
of extensive debate among legal scholars." 94
The issue of environmental justice remains a vexing and difficult
one for policymakers and decision-makers. As Michael Gerrard
argued during the panel discussion, the key challenge for
enviromnental law (and to some extent land use law) is how we
balance the need for a community's self-determination with the need
for some of these "indisputable facilities?" 95 Gerrard also asked, "Is
there any other alternative to cramming these facilities [facilities that
emit wastes] down the throats of unwanting communities? What is
the alternative?" 96
Indeed, in looking at the current state of enviromnental law and the
future of environmental law, Professor Kaswan fittingly suggests that
the environmental justice movement and environmental sustainability
offer the environmental law movement "offer visionary,
comprehensive, and inclusive paths forward that could increase the
environmental movement's breadth and political strength." 97 The
Review hopes to continue producing such work in the future.
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Even as the Revieiw was at the forefront of pressing environmental
law issues that confronted the courts, in some ways judicial review
has, as Richard Stewart argues, undernined attempts to promote
greater cost/benefit and risk analyses in the regulatory process.98
Cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation has provided the
basis for estimating the enviromnental benefits that may or could be
realized from regulatory policies.99 Indeed, the rise of CBA has
forced the executive to require federal administrative agencies, such
as the EPA, to conduct regulatory cost-benefit analyses.oo These
94. Id. at 484.
95. Michael Gerrard, Panel Discussion, The Past, Present and Future of Title II
of the Civil Rights Act as a Tool of Environmental Justice, FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
393, 398 (1999).
96. Id. at 400.
97. See Kaswan, supra note 86., at 150.
98. Richard Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation? 29 CAP.
U. L. REV. 21, 170 (2001).
99. Id. at 170.
100. Id. at 40.
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analyses have been supervised and reviewed under the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), which has provided its own brand
of feedback to improve the process.101 It is quite clear, by following
some of the literature produced in the Review on CBA, that even
fairly constrained cost-benefit analysis can be useful in disciplining
the regulatory process but requires "judgment and considerations of
practicality in design and application."' 0 2 However, it is also clear
that CBA contains the real danger of undenmining enviromnental
protection when applied to environmental regulations.
Daniel Cole's 1996 essay in the Review offered that cost-benefit
analysis has its usefulness, but also suffers from significant
methodological limitations.' As he argued, the costs of
environmental regulations are comparatively easy to estimate
because they are mostly born by market participants (industry and
consumers), and thus are commonly denominated in dollars. On the
other hand, the benefits of enviromnental regulations, which include
breathing cleaner air and water, are not easily converted into dollar
signs. Consequently, cost-benefit analyses tend to be biased against
regulatory policies aimed at pollution prevention and resource
conservation.104 The only, and perhaps best, way to remove that bias
is to "adjust the analyses to better reflect the actual (though difficult
to quantify) welfare benefits of regulation."10
In her essay published in the Review in 1997, Reductionist
Regulatory Reform, Professor Lisa Heinzerling contended that the
goal of environmental law is not - as reductionist's one-dimensional
critiques concluded - solely to protect human health and such
101. Id.
102. See Stewart, supra note 98, at 42.
103. Daniel H. Cole, Accounting for Sustainable Development, 8 FORDHAM
EiNVTL. L.J. 123, 126 (1996) (saving that "the same problem of the failure to
account for pollution costs and (regulatory) prevention benefits pervades standard
cost-benefit analyses, which increasingly influence policy, particularly in the
United States.").
104. See id. Cole gives an interesting example of the likelihood that toxic
dumping will increase production in a variety of industries such as health care or
those that must clean-up the toxins. He argues the increase in production will
increase national income and therefore "as far as national income statistics are
concerned, toxic waste discharges paradoxically provide net economic benefits for
society." Id. at 124.
105. Id. at 126-127.
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reductionism undermines laws that are meant to protect humans.106
Quantifying lives saved, Professor Heinzerling argued, should not be
the sole measurement for environmental regulations and such
";estimates expressly exclude any consideration other than saving
human lives in judging the wisdom of regulation."107 Heinzerling's
work on cost-benefit analysis, particularly its pitfalls, has been a
mainstay of the debate on the issue among environmental law
scholars in the United States.108 In fact, Heinzerling's Review, article
became the catalyst for her oft-cited and groundbreaking book,
Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of
Nothing. The themes that appeared in the Review 's article are
elaborated in depth and breadth in Heinzerling's book (co-authored
with Frank Ackennan). One the many powerful points made in the
book is that "[P]utting a price on human life.. .is clearly unacceptable
to virtually all religions and moral philosophies."109
Stephen Clowney, however, offered a quite different perspective
on cost-benefit analysis that seemingly satisfies both economists and
conservationists. He argued, in his Review article, that the traditional
unthinking cost-benefit process is largely compatible with the main
tenets of environmental movement. If "[u]sed correctly, cost-benefit
analysis not only promotes the practical goals of environmental
activists but also bolsters the values that underlie the entire
106. Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Reform, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
459, 461 (1997).
107. Id. at 463.
108. See e.g. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943 at n.
3 (1999); See Stewart, supra note 98, at n. 94. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage
Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental La,
23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 at n. 4 (1999); J.B. Ruhi and James Salzman, Mozart
and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative
State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 807 at n. 165 (2002); Douglas Kysar., Climate Change,
Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality., 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFT. L.
REV. 555, 558 at n. 15 (2004); Fred Bosselman, Wfhat Lawmakers Can Learn From
Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 207, 300 at n. 594 (2001):
Douglas Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications
of Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and
Policy. 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 223, 261 at n. 217 (2003).
109. FRANK ACKERMAN AND LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 1, 71 (2004).
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progressive agenda."" 0 Clowney concludes that "Lasting and
effective policy will only emerge when both diehard economists and
militant conservationists agree upon a framework for making
decisions about the natural world..." 1
CONCLUSION
As Professor Sweeney said in 1993, "we cannot rest on these past
achievements. Our job for the future includes the hard work of study,
analysis and writing to produce a Journal that can be relied on as
being fair and accurate."112
When the Volume 24 Editorial Board took over the helm of the
Review, they decided to make a concerted effort to go above and
beyond what the Review has ever done in the past, while also
recognizing the solid foundation that the journal was standing on.
That strong foundation served as a platform for which the Editorial
Board could embark on ambitious projects, such as the 20th
Anniversary issue. Finally, after nearly a year of hard work and
dedication from the entire Review staff and the authors, we have
arrived at a milestone
The goal for the Review this year was to attempt to scale some
heights that would serve as a catalyst for future scholarly
contributions that are the hallmark of premier legal scholarship in the
ever-changing American legal academia. Indeed, the Review has
begun to adapt to the changing nature of environmental law and to
American legal scholarship generally, but it concededly still has
some ways to go to catch up with, what is, a fast-moving and
transformative legal academia that is churning out contributions in
"law and interdisciplinary" work, legal theory and empirical studies
of the law.
The momentum surrounding this issue will perhaps generate future
contributions that expand the Review 's content to empirical studies of
environmental lawx's impact on society, environmental law and
110. See Stephen Clowney., Environmental Ethics and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 18
FORDHAM EiNVTL. L. REV. 105. 109 (2006) (acknowledging that "[a] new
generation of scholars, working primarily through the lens of environmental law, is
casting fresh doubts on the basic desirability of CBA as a policy-making tool."). Id
at 108.
111. Id.
112. See Sweeney, supra note I., at 1.
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interdisciplinary scholarship and environmental legal theory. There is
all the reason to believe the Review, is on its way to becoming a
primary source for future scholarship in the abovementioned
discipline areas, while in keeping with its success in informing jurists
and practitioners with important doctrinal scholarship and legislative
and regulatory analysis.
The discipline of environmental law has come a long way since its
humble beginnings. As Professor Sweeney once said, "Thus, our
celebration... rests on the shoulders of many nameless men and
women - zealots for Enviromnental Law."11 3 Today, we salute the
staff members, the Editors-in-Chief and faculty - just as Professor
Sweeney did 20 years ago - for their hard work and dedication to the
Revieiw. Without you, this celebration would not be possible. We
hope that the Rev iew continues to rise in the legal world as an
eminent source of creative, innovative and novel contributions on the
past, present and future state of enviromnental law.
To advance what Professor Sweeney said 20 years ago: because
the field of environmental law is now in its mature stages, our work
as students of the law, practitioners of the law and professors of the
law is performed at the height of this intellectual discipline.' 14
113. See Sweeney, supra note 1, at 2.
114. See Sweeney, supra note 1. (saying "because the field of Environmental
Law is still in its initial stages, your work is performed in the dawn of this
intellectual discipline.").
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